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Michael Krausz (born 1942) was a Swiss-born American philosopher as well as an artist and orchestral conductor. His philosophical works focus on the theory of interpretation, theory of knowledge, philosophy of science, philosophy of history, and philosophy of art and music. Krausz was Milton C. Nahm Professor of Philosophy at Bryn Mawr College, and he teaches Aesthetics at the Curtis Institute of Music. He has taught at University of Toronto and has been visiting professor at American University, Georgetown University, Oxford University, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, American University in Cairo, University of Nairobi, Indian Institute of Advanced Study, and University of Ulm, among others. Krausz was the co-founder (with Joseph Margolis) and former Chair of the fourteen-institution Greater Philadelphia Philosophy Consortium.
Krausz earned a PhD from University of Toronto, including post-graduate work at Linacre College. He was a Special Student at the London School of Economics, and holds a BA from Rutgers University and an MA from Indiana University. His notable teachers include Sir Isaiah Berlin, William Dray, Patrick Gardiner, Rom Harré, Sir Karl Popper, and John Oulton Wisdom. He has also been influenced by R.G. Collingwood, Joseph Margolis and Bimal Krishna Matilal.
Krausz currently serves as series editor for a number of publications, including Brill Publishers Series in Philosophy of History and Culture, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Series on Philosophy and the Global Context,
Singularism asserts that objects of interpretation always answer to one and only one ideal interpretation. In contrast, multiplism asserts that objects of interpretation may answer to more than one opposed interpretation. Both singularism and multiplism require that competing interpretations address one and the same object of interpretation. Where different interpretations address different objects of interpretation, an innocuous pluralism occurs.Krausz, Rightness and Reasons, chap. 2. Where objects of interpretation cannot be delineated as to number, neither singularism nor multiplism can apply.Krausz, Interpretation and Transformation, chap. 10.
Krausz probes the relation between these ideals of interpretation and their ontologies.Krausz, “Interpretation and Its Objects.” Singularism and multiplism are each compatible with either realism or constructivism. Singularism does not uniquely entail realism (and vice versa) and multiplism does not uniquely entail constructivism (and vice versa). Orthodox combinations include singularist-realism and multiplist-constructivism. Heterodox combinations include singularist-constructivism and multiplist-realism.Krausz, “Interpretation and Its Objects.”
Krausz affirms that the contest between singularism and multiplism is logically detachable from the contest between realism and constructivism.Krausz, Limits of Rightness, chap. 4,5. He further shows that the contest between singularism and multiplism is detachable from a range of other ontologies that fall under the reconciliatory heading of “constructive realism.”Krausz, Limits of Rightness, chap. 5–9 None of the ontologies in Krausz’s inventory of constructive realisms uniquely entails either singularism or multiplism (and vice versa). Yet Krausz denies that his “detachability thesis” demonstrates that ontology as such is unnecessary for the theory of interpretation. For the question of the countability of objects of interpretation as well as interpretations themselves is ontological.Krausz. “Interpretation and Its Objects.” Krausz extends the notion of ideals of interpretation to ideals of life paths or projects, such as self-realization.Krausz, Interpretation and Transformation, chap. 9, 10 That is, directional singularism is the view that for a given person there is one admissible life path, and directional multiplism is the view that for a given person there may be more than one admissible life path. He develops the idea of directional multiplism from a non-essentialist or non-foundational view of human nature.Michael Krausz, Limits of Rightness, chap. 13.
II. Relativism. In addition, Krausz’s work on relativism canvasses the range and significance of relativistic doctrines and rehearses their virtues and vices. He considers relativism as the claim that truth, goodness, or beauty (among other values) is relative to some reference frame, and no absolute standards to adjudicate between reference frames exist. He defines and differentiates various strands of absolutism: realism, universalism and foundationalism.Michael Krausz, “Mapping Relativisms,” chap. 1. In Michael Krausz, ed., Relativism: A Contemporary Anthology. New York: Columbia University Press, 2010. Krausz argues that when these strands of absolutism are unwoven, and when relativism is understood as the negation of these strands, classical self-refutation arguments against relativism do not apply.Krausz, “Mapping Relativisms.”Michael Krausz, “The Debate,” chap. 1. In Michael Krausz and Rom Harré, eds. Varieties of Relativism. Oxford: Basil Blackwell Publishers, 1996 In turn, Krausz considers whether the idea of “undifferentiated ” survives the relativist challenge. He suggests that the assertion of undifferentiated unity, instanced for example in some Asian soteriologies, is compatible with relativism as here he defines it.Michael Krausz, Dialogues on Relativism, Absolutism, and Beyond: Four Days in India, Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2011, Day Four.
Krausz's paintings depict various spatial planes at once, embodying scripted messages of no literal significance. They are concerned with the emergence and dissolution of ciphers in infinite spaces. The works embody a kind of automatic writing arising from conductorial musical gestures in meditative spaces. The paintings are done with dry pigment on museum board and other mixed media.
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